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Caring to Know argues that “caring is not the ‘other’ of reason and that our lived experi-
ences of caring and being cared for can be useful resources for truth-seeking” (1). This 
claim is fleshed out over six chapters using a creative blend of analytical feminist theory, 
virtue theory of knowledge, and cross-cultural philosophy. The brief conclusion braids 
together different strands of the argument. 
While laying out the groundwork in Chapter 1, Dalmiya allows the reader to study the 
toolbox she deploys to develop a “care-based epistemology.” This move is indeed inge-
nious, given the book’s ambitious project. In developing such an epistemology, Caring to 
Know uses salient insights of care ethics to think about how our “background relational-
ity” impacts our knowing (45). In traversing this relatively underexplored trail, the re-
viewed book leans on an interpretation of a virtue theory of knowledge, which can fruit-
fully combine central arguments of care ethics with epistemology. In addition, the book 
embeds its explorations in a cross-cultural framework of the Indian epic Mahābhārata. 
Dalmiya is not content with an understanding of caring, whose sole focus lies on reshap-
ing morality. Rather, she prefers to use caring “to redefine reason and rationality at the 
same time that it attempts to reshape morality” (3). Why? “Care ethics and care episte-
mology are  . . . joined at the hip” (3). Dalmiya’s care-based epistemology is premised on 
an understanding of a knower familiar to readers conversant with feminist scholarship. 
Conventional moral theories model their knowers as disembedded, abstract, and neutral 
reasoners who can arrive independently at the same transcendent, context-free, univer-
sal rules. In contrast, the knower of this care-based epistemology uses her experience of 
concrete situations to reflect on them, as well as to tease out ways of behaving appropri-
ately in similar situations in the future. 
To behave in a moral way, this knower is thus dependent on her own particular ways of 
being in, and knowing, the world. Importantly, as an embodied being, this knower finds 
herself placed within a particular web of relationships. Each relationship within this web 
is associated with certain needs. The knower/carer uses her own positionality in this web 
to deliberate upon, understand, and (ideally) fulfil these needs. The emotional responses, 
which she elicits, help her fine-tune her interrelation with other members in these rela-
tionships. Meanwhile, her own emotional responses to the concrete situation allow her 
to take up responsibility for needs met, and also for resulting omissions. Dalmiya prom-
ises to illustrate that precisely this way of intuiting a knower has the potential to help us 
better shape our own interpersonal encounters. Such a knower would, universally, at-
tempt to minimize, if not avoid, oppression, exploitation, marginalization, and privilege 
in these encounters. 
One could argue that Dalmiya’s specific modeling of such a knower already pushes the 
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book toward relational humility. After all, such a knower “soils” herself in “the messy 
world” of interpersonal relationships (7). Committing herself to being a carer in a par-
ticular relationship, the emotional demands associated with this relationship force her 
to be perceptive to the needs of the cared-for. To ably fulfill them, she cannot afford to 
posit herself as the neutral, sole, true knower of their interests. She must have her ear to 
the ground and be perceptive to their needs; some degree of communication with them 
is necessary. However, given that caring for multiple others could give rise to conflict-
ing demands, the carer might have to work out compromises so that the needs of all 
the cared-for can indeed be met adequately. In other words: caring is an intellectually 
demanding task. As a process that stretches into time, it can, nevertheless, be honed 
through mindful practice (22). On both of these counts, the salience of the virtue of rela-
tional humility is easy to see. “Relational humility is the necessary condition of success-
ful care,” Dalmiya notes,  and arguably “the condition for successful inquiry as well” (26). 
If this is indeed the case, what value does the Mahābhārata add to this discussion? Why 
recur to a text steeped in Hindu tradition, myth, and social hierarchy, when the author 
herself concedes that “it was not interested in a feminist future” (133)?
Still today, the Mahābhārata captures the moral imagination of several thousands of 
people worldwide. Drawing on it, Dalmiya is able not only to embed her account. With 
a vivid description and creative interpretation of its parables and stories, she can also 
stabilize other ways of understanding interpersonal relationships. Moreover, weaving 
in tales from the Mahābhārata, she is able to usher in narratives that—despite the epic’s 
antiquity—may help us understand what it means to be a human being in today’s highly 
exploitative world. 
Chapter 2, for example, confronts us with a relatively unbecoming scene featuring the 
Mahābhārata’s paragon of virtue, Yudhiśṭhira (50). After having wagered his kingdom, 
his wealth, and himself to his cousins (the Kauravas) in a dice game, Yudhiśṭhira pawns 
off his wife Draupadi. Dragged out and disrobed in front of the royal assembly, the men-
struating Draupadi points out what could seem to be a mere technicality: Does someone 
like Yudhiśṭhira, who has already forfeited the right to his own self, have any plausible 
claim on her anymore? Dalmiya reads into the thunderous silence that greets Draupadi’s 
outburst in the assembly some philosophically significant points. Draupadi draws the as-
sembly’s, and the reader’s, attention to her own concrete situation on various levels: As a 
menstruating female, she should be secluded; as someone born into their common high 
caste, she should not be subjected to the humiliation meted out to her by him. Moreover, 
she is related to several people involved in the dice game, and these relationships should 
shield her from such inhuman treatment. But Dalmiya’s creative reading does not halt 
here. 
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She uses this story to draw attention to the imperfectability of care. Even a virtue para-
gon, like Yudhiśṭhira, did become insensitive to the vulnerability of his dependents. In 
the stressful situation he finds himself in, he loses his own identity as a relational self, and 
with it his moral compass. He cannot adequately respond to the needs of his wife (52). 
Furthermore, the author brings to our notice how the Mahābhārata makes room for the 
alterity of Draupadi’s voice in public. This menstruating and disrobed wife of the former 
king neither accepts her fate nor remains silent. She challenges her husband in the pres-
ence of a predominantly male audience. Her outrage, it seems, is mainly directed toward 
her husband, who has allowed himself to be catapulted out of his identity as a relational 
self, an identity that was fundamental to their spousal relationship. (In the course of the 
epic, Yudhiśṭhira is able to regain the relational self he lost in this assembly.) In addition, 
Draupadi’s ire is also directed toward the onlookers, many of whom are her relatives. By 
not intervening to end her humiliation, they too fail to act on their identity as relational 
selves.  
Dalmiya carefully uses tales such as these to underscore the contextuality, ambiguity, 
and uncertainty of an ethical life. This life cannot be mastered with the help of prede-
termined, context-neutral, universal rules. Living a good life, rather, involves attend-
ing to and practicing the various dimensions of care: caring about someone one values, 
experiencing the attitudinal reorientation that ensues, taking care of this person within 
a broader social context, acknowledging the care given, and finally, developing a second-
order caring about care. The reflexive moment of the latter stabilizes the attitudinal and 
volitional transformations brought about by care (66–74), ensuring that care does not 
collapse into self-abnegation. “Attention to the other does not flow from inattention to 
the self ” (78). Arguably, this self-reflection, which is grounded in an interrelationality, 
guards against a paternalist appropriation of the cared-for as well. 
Chapter 3 draws out various aspects of being a good epistemic knower. Given the book’s 
care-epistemological project, Dalmiya unsurprisingly distances herself from rule- and 
faculty-based, as well as individualistic, conceptions of epistemic success. But how 
does she develop a “holistic way of articulating intellectual virtue” with a cross-cultural 
punch? Inspired by Linda Zagzebski’s general framework of virtue epistemology, the au-
thor reads relevant passages of the Mahābhārata as sources that can help us make sense 
of virtue responsibilism. Good epistemic practice depends on cultivating certain virtues. 
While different narratives about a virtuous knower in the epic iterate that relational hu-
mility is an intellectual virtue, it is important to underscore the epic’s specific under-
standing of this virtue. The Mahābhārata suggests that the narrow pursuit of truth may 
have to be abandoned when the situation demands it. How so? Dalmiya distinguishes 
between two ways in which the term Dharma (roughly: morality) is used in the text. The 
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“big-D Dharma” deals with general moral precepts and principles that are binding for 
all human beings. This Dharma also refers to the cosmic law, the telos of the universe. 
For its part, “small-d dharma” or “little-d dharma” specifies general instructions on how 
to behave in particular contextual roles (101, 58–59). Within the life span of individu-
als, moral specifications emanating from both Dharmas might clash. In such cases, a 
virtuous knower will strive to maintain the reign of “big-D Dharma” for one particular 
reason: by harmonizing several values, this Dharma attains cosmic balance. 
Specific agents may be prone to not seeing the broader picture. They continue to clasp 
onto “little-d dharma.” Take Yudhiśṭhira’s willful misinformation during the aforemen-
tioned battle, for example. To stave off further killing on the battlefield, the divine Kŗśṇa 
instructed Yudhiśṭhira to carry out a subterfuge. To get his opponent Droṇa to lay down 
his arms, Kŗśṇa suggested that Yudhiśṭhira simply proclaim that Aśvattāma was killed. 
The plan played on the deliberate confusion between Aśvattāma the elephant and Droṇa’s 
son of the same name. On the battlefield, Yudhiśṭhira proceeded as agreed. However, 
faced with the prospect of giving up the moral norms encoded in his dharma for Dhar-
ma, Yudhiśṭhira got cold feet. He clung to his dharma as an “inflexible rule-follower” 
(106) and muttered under his breath that the elephant Aśvattāma was dead. Believing 
that he had lost his son, Droṇa immediately laid down his arms. And yet, the epic berates 
Yudhiśṭhira for choosing to deceive his cousin in order to maintain his own self-image 
as a truth-teller. He is said to have failed morally because he was unable to organize his 
beliefs within a “broader axiological horizon” (106–7). As a result, Yudhiśṭhira, unlike 
other moral heroes, did not immediately enter heaven toward the end of his life on earth; 
he had to make up for this sin. Again, we see this virtue exemplar failing to grasp the 
relationality of his self, his own place in the larger world. 
The episode illustrates a larger point too: Knowing that there is no direct relation between 
the possession of certain virtues and epistemic excellence may not necessarily suffice. 
One must also know how this excellence can be achieved. One way would be to increase 
the pool of possible knowledge sources across the social spectrum. The Mahābhārata 
helps us to understand this point through the story of someone who has “social capital” 
as a knower (109). Troubled by his own moral failing after having killed a harmless bird, 
the learned sage Kauśika sought out a Brahmin housewife and a butcher, both placed 
on the lower rungs of the social hierarchy. He learns from these “deviant” others that 
knowledge about life and larger metaphysical questions depends neither on social status 
nor solely on theoretical ruminations. It can also be gleaned from knowing how to lead 
a morally upright life, even if this life is led under relatively mundane circumstances. 
These interpersonal encounters initiate a “deep characterological transformation” (113) 
in the learned sage. Kauśika flips through several emotional registers, which first make 
him ascribe ignorance to himself. He then proceeds to carry out the necessary steps to 
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rectify this ignorance. This self-important Brahmin learns to give up his own “epistemic 
privilege” and become receptive to “cognitive Others,” who happen to be placed at the 
social margins (114). Motivated by his own awareness of his “positive ignorance,” he 
decenters himself while centering them within his cognitive orbit (115). With him, we 
realize that these moments “of self-receding and other-foregrounding” are “organically 
related” (119). He becomes a humble knower within this community of interdependent 
knowers. 
Dalmiya rightly directs our attention to how a male knower like Kauśika is made to 
see the importance of maintaining knowledge communities such that knowers like him 
can continue in their truth-pursuing activities. We can now better grasp why intellec-
tual virtues have a strong social dimension. Knowledge can only be accrued when the 
groups in which intellectual debates take place abide by moral practices. Epistemology 
and morality, as the author underscored at the outset, are joined at the hip. But how can 
relational humility be cultivated in a society “where knowledge itself is valued as power” 
(134)? Why should the epistemically privileged voluntarily relinquish their social capital 
in this regard? 
Chapter 4 guides us through a thick tapestry of arguments that could provide an answer. 
Let me attempt to briefly give a sense of the main strands here. As we saw, Kauśika master-
fully overcomes his own ignorance by boldly seeking out deviant sources of knowledge. 
However laudatory such individual attempts may be, they cannot immediately overturn 
systemic oppression. Several Kauśikas would be needed for this purpose. Note another 
difficulty: such individual attempts may not alter the social status of those involved at 
all. In the narrative, the housewife, the butcher, and the sage continue to inhabit their 
social roles, even though the latter claims to have been transformed by the encounter. 
Read through our own lens, Kauśika could be accused of cultural appropriation. He uses 
the subaltern Others to further his own narrow agenda. We catch up with him when he 
relinquishes his epistemic power; at the end of the process, this center of Brahmanical 
privilege has just increased his privilege through his forays into the margins. So, what 
would be the way forward? 
Kauśika’s decision to learn from subalterns could be traced back to him becoming pain-
fully aware of the contingency of the social fortune afforded by his caste and gender. Such 
a reflection on one’s own social status is “materially grounded and inflected by structures 
of privilege and oppression (144). Kauśika knows that he does not know something that 
he as a sage should have known. In addition to projecting others as possible knowers, 
this self-ascription also gestures to the possibility that his ignorance could be systemic. 
Current structures of knowledge production in his society prove to be inadequate for 
his purposes. His own epistemic privilege could simply have resulted from ingrained 
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patterns of attributing socioepistemic privilege. This realization, coupled with his intel-
lectual humility, could bring the center of such a privilege to become unsteady and falter. 
This seems to be a fair point. But what vested interest would the dispossessed have in 
adopting the virtue of intellectual humility? Would it not threaten to increase their op-
pression when they give up their guard when encountering their oppressors? 
Kauśika’s shame motivates him to act. Having killed a harmless bird in a fit of anger, he 
perceives himself as falling short of his own ideals; a sage like him should simply not 
have given into rage. In attempting to curb his rage, Kauśika allows himself to be guided 
by another experience: feeling shame. He is overcome by the “pre-linguistic normative 
awareness” of the latter, which forces him to act (153). Although his own behavior (seek-
ing out a housewife and butcher) may not necessarily find the approval of his Brahmani-
cal society, it leads him to an “appreciation of differential privilege” (154). At least in his 
case, the experience of shame paves his way to relational humility. However, to learn 
from his subaltern Others, Kauśika has to equalize them; he has to place them on par 
with his own Brahmanical male self. When their interaction begins, he experiences “a 
mental shift towards impartiality” (160). His search for truth is not affected by the social 
status of his informants. This shifting could initiate a further shift in ensuring “condi-
tions of justice,” as the Mahābhārata highlights (160). 
At this point in the discussion, Dalmiya opens our eyes to the possibility that shame 
could be triggered by experiences relative to one’s social status. The dispossessed, for 
example, could feel shame after having become acutely aware of the injustice meted out 
to them (as in Draupadi’s public humiliation). “Since complicity (if any) is allowing these 
injustices to continue, the resulting shame in such instances leads to articulating resis-
tance” (162). Note, though, that privilege itself depends on the roles one inhabits. Just as 
a female white professor may be more socially dominant than a male bus driver of color 
depending on the situation in which they encounter each other, a Dalit professor in con-
temporary India could be more socially dominant than a Brahmin housewife with mini-
mal education. “Margins are relative depending on where we plot the center,” Dalmiya 
adds (162). In other words, social universes, which are drawn around centers of socio-
epistemic privilege, start to wobble when those placed at the center begin to practice 
relational humility. Notably, these universes have several such centers of privilege; they 
move with our perspective on them. Given this fluctuating state of affairs, it behooves 
moral agents to adopt the disposition of relational humility if they seek to minimize 
the degree of cruelty they inflict on others. One way to do so would be to allow for, and 
perhaps foster, articulations of resistance when they are voiced by those who perceive 
themselves as underprivileged.
Careful readers of this review would rightly anticipate that this insight cannot be inter-
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preted as a universal rule. Rather, it is more of a kind of reasoning, or yukti, that would 
enable one to carefully appraise the complexities of a moral situation. This aligns with 
the epic’s use of the concept of dvaidha, “which signifies an immersion in plurality and 
alternatives” (171). Just as a good doctor has all the possible symptoms in the back of his 
or her head when diagnosing a disease, a good epistemic knower would have an “ever-
present simmering and clamouring background of alternatives” relevant to the appraisal 
of a (moral) situation (174). Single-dimensional (moral) rules, on the other hand, “lead 
the imaginative muscles of [our] moral sense” (prajṇā) to stall and freeze since they are 
not designed for complexity (172). And yet, dvaidha does not necessarily lead to the 
desired result. Good moral decisions are like shots in the dark. Even if some of them 
woefully miss their mark, they can be helpful in honing our decision-making processes 
for the next round. 
Chapter 5 then brews the right blend of caring and knowing. It seeks to increase the 
moral focus of our relationality so that “entrenched social biases” can be overcome. Si-
multaneously, however, it endeavors to curb the demands of relationality so that one is 
“not drained by the incessant cacophony of needs demanding to be met” (189). Readers 
should by now be well prepared to follow the moves involved in facing this demanding 
task. Relational humility is a “hybrid virtue,” which slices through the distinctions of 
the epistemic, ethical, and political domains (187, 193). Kauśika, as we saw, is ready to 
give up his comfort zone, the small spot under the tree under which he meditates, and 
meet the housewife and butcher in their own respective spaces. This sage, whose main 
activity until then had been solitary meditation, bootstraps himself out of this solitude; 
he engages with “radical others” on their own turf and learns from them. Kauśika is able 
to overcome the “deeply prejudicial environments” of knowledge spaces in his society 
(195). But how can we learn to overcome our biases, “which masquerade as common 
sense or fact” (196)? Here the care-perspective is crucial. 
We are involved in caring relationships, in which we care for others and are cared by 
them. Our own commitment to being caring people can allow us to step beyond the 
narrow confines of our own caring communities. Carried along by warm memories of 
being cared for, we feel for those unrelated Others whose needs are unmet or not suffi-
ciently met. If we value ourselves as caring persons, we acquire and hone our disposition 
to relational humility in “concrete caring relations” (199). Good mothers, nevertheless, 
know that an excessive, and perhaps obsessive, attention to one’s own children tends to 
smother their future development (even as future carers). Likewise, good caring agents 
will know that excessive attention to one’s own caring community is counterproductive 
and can undermine functional relationships of care. In both cases, one must “go off the 
ego-line” (204). 
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Our discussion about receptivity in the Mahābhārata furthers the discussion here. The 
worry that this understanding of care could violate the fact-value distinction is unfound-
ed. As the quote from Jonardon Ganeri vividly underscores, truth must be permitted “to 
run riot in the soul” (211). Clinically separating descriptive truth from normativity can-
not but be an academic, armchair exercise, which, as Yudhiśṭhira learned, is fraught with 
moral peril. This moral exemplar, as we saw above, failed the test of intellectual virtuosity 
precisely on this ground. By not grasping that truth spreads horizontally “across the vari-
ous normative maps we employ in our lives,” he failed to practice truth (213). So far, so 
good. But how does Dalmiya attempt to reign in the draining effects of care?
Here, the political perspective becomes salient. Several modern liberal states tend to 
privatize care. By restricting it to domestic spaces, caring activity is in general removed 
from the public eye. In the process, it is rendered as being relatively insignificant. Yet, a 
moment’s contemplation on one’s daily life would indicate that there is a disconnect here. 
Care is a fundamental aspect of our lives. If we, as Dalmiya argues, carefully studied car-
ing virtues, we would realize that these virtues are interwoven in the very moral fabric of 
our communities. She hopes that by “self-consciously wedd[ing] . . . feminist sensibili-
ties” with the “radical potential” of the Mahābhārata, we can begin to conceive being a 
citizen in a wholly new way (224). We would then perceive ourselves and our co-citizens 
as also foreigners sharing in the same human vulnerability.
However, one worry voiced earlier remains: against the background of our current social 
practices, relational humility seems to be a good option mainly for those whom a society 
marks as being privileged. Practicing relational humility, these moral agents can make 
clear, even to their underprivileged counterparts, that they are indeed keen on shedding 
their own privilege. But despite the caveats offered above, adopting relational humility 
may be rash, even unwise, for those who continue to perceive themselves as oppressed. 
Dalmiya’s conception would counter this worry with the following observation: even the 
underprivileged would do well to practice this virtue for the reasons elucidated earlier. 
If, however, they in their encounters with the privileged, have reason to hold that “some 
griefs and memories of harm continue to haunt,” they could choose to opt out of such a 
relationship (79).
Chapter 6 continues braiding the book’s main argument by shedding light on two types 
of “care-knowing.” Although both relate to truth-seeking inquiry, care-knowing I results 
when caring is practiced as an epistemic skill, whereas care-knowing II ensues when 
knowing is guided by the caring disposition discussed earlier. To get a better grip on this 
distinction, Dalmiya reflects on the first form as a “virtue of mechanism” with which we 
relate to other minds, the second as a form that gives important clues about the world 
around us (124). 
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Let us consider how those at the center of epistemic privilege can possibly relate to 
marginalized others like paraplegics or women inhabiting different sociocultural back-
grounds. A classic answer would be through empathy. This emotion would help us open 
ourselves up and transport ourselves into their world. Dalmiya cautions that imagina-
tion (i.e., placing ourselves in a marginalized person’s shoes), albeit being a good way 
to start, could lead to a projection of the Other, which is starkly modeled on one’s own 
self. As a result, the “radical otherness” of the empathized person could be erased in the 
process (245). One reason is that our social spaces are power encoded. How to proceed, 
then? Well-intended “formalistic mantras” of avoiding this short circuit seem to have 
very little “inductive success” (246). This is where care-knowing I steps in. 
Through this caring practice, the carer/knower makes herself vulnerable in knowing the 
Other. She lays open her fumbling, her “dis-ease” (289), her discomfort in capturing the 
otherness of the Other. Through foregrounding her own vulnerability, she transforms 
herself from a “subject of knowledge to an object of curiosity” for the Other (249). Mak-
ing a concerted attempt at this transparency signals to the other person that the carer 
is intent not to harm her. She can indeed be a trustworthy person in whom one could 
confide. The trust that ensues between them could put the carer in a better position to 
respond to the interests of the cared-for. In a further step, she can help to articulate these 
interests in the public sphere as demands and entitlements. Nevertheless, knowing oth-
ers through such caring practice can easily slide into oppressive relations, as many carers 
intimately know. Ideally, this slippage can be halted when the carer harnesses her “virtue 
of mechanism” through her disposition to care (care-knowing II). This latter knowing, 
as we saw above, is motivated by relational humility. As a virtue that weaves in emotions 
(like shame) and democratic intuitions (like the equalizing we witnessed above), it is 
thus better positioned to guide epistemic practice. It has the potential to “enable micro-
relations of respectful interchange” (277). Importantly, Dalmiya’s care-knowing II not 
only hinders oppression in dyadic relationships. It holds the promise of reconfiguring 
our intellectual landscape by bringing into the fold new, or hitherto oppressed and/or 
erased conceptual schemes too. We learn to perceive them as potentially equal alterna-
tives that merit our engaged scholarly attention and concern.
Caring to Know is a rich, multilayered book. It may warrant several revisitations so that 
its insights can come upon one like “cataplectic flashes” (169). Remarkably, the author 
places her own project, “comparative feminist philosophy” (and with it this book), largely 
within the constructive branch of comparative philosophy (296, 292). This branch fo-
cuses on common problems within different philosophical traditions and hopes to create 
a “more comprehensive third space” (296). Arguably, the book does try to carve out such 
a space. 
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Yet Caring to Know cannot be subsumed under the umbrella of conventional compara-
tive philosophical approaches. Unlike other “giants of comparative philosophy,” this au-
thor does not content herself with merely “locating Sanskrit conceptual terms on the 
conceptual map of Western theories of knowledge and meta-epistemological debates” 
(98). In fact, the book’s methodological insights invite one to radically question and cri-
tique previous ways of doing comparative philosophy. It calls us to “engage with the 
messy issues of unjust privilege,” which play out in this discipline too (279). In this re-
gard, it urges us to critically contemplate our own power-encoded spaces when we do 
(comparative) philosophy. 
One upshot of the same would be that we can no longer pretend that we are able to cap-
ture the “essence” of “Eastern” and “Western” philosophical traditions. The development 
of such supposedly diametrical positions has itself resulted from sociohistorical contin-
gencies. The book furthermore encourages us, as philosophers, to boldly engage with a 
radical philosophical “self-making,” which, among other things, will allow us to, when 
indicated, experience shame at the miserable track record of our discipline (289). As the 
book highlights on several occasions, academic Euroamerican philosophy as we know it 
today has, in general, used its social privilege to posit itself at the center of philosophical 
activity. 
If these observations are plausible, the book demands of us as humble relational knowers 
to refrain from simple cultural juxtapositions. Not only are such exercises naively blind 
to the power politics played out in philosophy; they might also cause serious damage to 
those subjects whose lives are entangled with the other traditions we study. Our current 
landscape, even in comparative philosophy, is still dominated by a “hegemony in the 
production of theories where the non-Western can only serve as ‘objects’ of study in dis-
cursive systems originating from the West” (302). Humble relational knowers cannot be 
complicit in such practices. We must do everything in our ability, in concert with others, 
to get these centers of academic activity to wobble. 
